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Banking & Finance

Paying Bank Examiners
for Performance
Should regulators receive bonuses for effectively
guarding the public interest?
By M. Todd Henderson University of Chicago School of Law
And Frederick Tung Boston University Law School

F

ew doubt that executive compensation arrangements
encouraged the excessive risk taking by banks that led
to the financial crisis of 2008. Accordingly, academics
and lawmakers have called for the reform of banker
pay practices. But regulator pay is to blame as well, and fixing
it may be easier and more effective than reforming banker pay.
Regulatory failures during the crisis resulted at least in part
from a lack of sufficient incentives for bank examiners to act
aggressively to prevent excessive risk taking by banks. While
banker pay may have been too high-powered—too focused on
shareholder value and insufficiently sensitive to potential losses,
which would ultimately be borne by taxpayers—bank regulators’
pay was not high-powered enough and therefore, ironically, also
insufficiently sensitive to potential losses to taxpayers.
Bank regulators are not paid for performance. They are civil
servants paid a fixed salary that does not depend on whether their
actions improve banks’ performance, protect banks from failure,
or increase social welfare. In fact, trying to curb risk taking at a
bank may be personally very costly for a bank regulator. Without
a larger upside than what civil service compensation offers, regulators too often do the rational thing and play it safe, shying away
from confrontation over potentially ill-advised bank policies.
To create better incentives, we propose that regulators, specifically bank examiners, be compensated in part with periodic
bonuses tied to the value of bank debt and equity, as well as a sepa-
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rate bonus linked to the timing of the decision to take over a failing
bank. Giving examiners a stake in bank performance, both upside
and downside, will improve their incentives to act in the public
interest. In contrast to most other types of bureaucratic functions,
objective metrics exist to help measure the alignment of bank
regulators’ activities with the public interest. With the right mix
of banks’ debt and equity securities, public trading prices for these
securities serve this purpose. A pay-for-performance culture therefore offers special promise for banking regulation as compared to
other areas of regulation or government bureaucracy.
Because examiners have shown a bias toward nonintervention,
we propose a debt-heavy mix of bank securities so that regulators
bear the downside risk of nonintervention. To address insider
trading and government ownership issues, we propose that regulators hold “phantom” securities whose payout is linked with
actual bank debt and equity prices.
Though we do not discount the value of public spiritedness
and reputation as inducements toward conscientious regulation,
regulators’ dismal performance in the recent financial crisis
makes us skeptical that public-spirited motivations are sufficient
incentive. At scores of banks, examiners and other regulators were
well aware of operational deficiencies and excessive risk taking
several years before those banks failed. But regulators stood still
in the face of this information. Instead of demanding corrective
action by banks, examiners continued to rate risky institutions as
“fundamentally sound.” Washington Mutual (WaMu), the largest
bank to fail in U.S. history at the time, enjoyed a “fundamentally
sound” rating until six days before its collapse. This regulatory
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proposal could have large effects on the efficiency of banking regulation. The need to incentivize regulators is especially important
after the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation, whose
say-on-pay provision is likely to generate even higher-powered
incentives for managers to maximize shareholders’ private interests. High-powered bank CEO incentives require a corresponding
impetus for regulators to proactively constrain bank risk taking.

Regulators’ Pay and Its Discontents
We are not the first to point out the problems with the standard
pay structure for bureaucrats. Four decades ago, Gary Becker
and George Stigler published a seminal article arguing for
incentive pay for the enforcement of laws. Their suggestions
were perhaps ahead of their time. Not until nearly 20 years later
did performance pay for CEOs become common practice. It
would likely have been something of a stretch to adopt performance pay for government agents before private sector actors.
Our incentive compensation proposal borrows not only from
the neglected economics literature of the past. It also finds hope
in changed pay practices for government officials implemented
in the last few years. The Obama administration has dramatically
increased regulators’ salaries. According to public records, the
number of federal government officials earning six-figure salaries has skyrocketed. In addition, bank regulatory agencies have
begun using bonuses ostensibly tied to performance. During the
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failure was not a result of insufficient information or attention
on the part of regulators. In the three years before WaMu’s collapse, examiners spent over 100,000 hours over 400 days inspecting its assets and operations. Despite the wealth of information,
examiners failed to do the heavy lifting required to stop the excessive risk taking. The WaMu example is hardly unique.
Adding or subtracting examiner pay based on bank capital
costs incentivizes regulators toward striking a socially optimal
balance between increasing bank values and credit and reducing
the costs of bank failure. This could mean more or less regulation, depending on the bank and the circumstances. For instance,
examiners with pay linked to bank debt may pursue a more interventionist approach in some cases, since they bear some of the
losses arising from the socially inefficient risk that exists on their
watch. Regulators incentivized to worry about losses to taxpayers may be more diligent in their supervision of bank assets and
management, may be more aggressive in assuring that corrective
recommendations are implemented, may encourage or require
changes to bank balance sheets, and so on.
Similarly, examiners who gain from increases in bank values
(for example, by holding phantom bank stock) may take steps to
make the examination process more efficient, to get the amount
and type of disclosures right, and to encourage valuable lending
and risk taking.
While we leave it to agency heads to develop optimal compensation practices over time, even small steps in the direction of our
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period 2003–2006, three regulator agencies—the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Office of Thrift Supervision, and Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency—paid out nearly $20 million
in retention and performance bonuses to bank examiners and
other regulators. In 2006 alone, the FDIC gave bonuses to 2,000
bank examiners.
While perhaps a step in the right direction, those modest
moves toward performance pay for regulators are less than ideal.
Ex post bonuses are not likely to yield incentives as high-powered
as our approach, which relies on ex ante incentive contracts tied to
outside metrics. Prior to the 1990s, CEOs routinely received cash
bonuses and yet pay and performance were not as tightly linked
as when stock and stock options came into use. To the extent
that ex post bonus payments are discretionary, they allow for the
intrusion of nonperformance-based criteria, such as favoritism,
political affiliation, and so on. The linkage between bonuses and
conduct that maximizes social welfare may therefore be tenuous.
Ex post bonuses are also likely to be one-sided—that is, paid in
good times but not recouped in bad times. This is likely to bias
regulation in a particular direction.

Regulator Pay and the 2008 Crisis
There is widespread agreement that regulators failed to act
aggressively enough during the recent financial crisis. The
problem was not one primarily of access to information, lack of
expertise, or resource constraints. Reviewing regulators’ performance following bank failures, regulatory agencies’ inspectors
general reached the same conclusion: regulators did a satisfactory job of identifying problems well in advance of failure, but
they failed to act aggressively enough to remedy the identified
problems. The problem, in our view, was that regulators did not
have the right incentives to turn their recommendations into
actual reforms of bank policies.
Regulatory failure | The examination process has two broad
goals: review of the quality of bank assets, with special focus
on the bank’s most important assets, its loans; and analysis of
the bank’s financial condition and the quality of its management and operations. Examiners enjoy wide discretion as to
the volume of loans reviewed, the nature of the examination,
the time spent on each analysis, and the consequences of the
examination results. Examiners make local judgments about
the credit quality of each asset. After discussion with loan officers and bank managers, examiners make final determinations
(effectively unreviewable) about how to classify particular loans
for input into a final supervisory rating. Examiners also review
loan portfolios as a whole for issues such as concentration risk,
violations of legal rules, and deviations from bank loan and
underwriting policies. They assess the behavior and impact
of subsidiaries and affiliates, risks from litigation, the costs
and benefits of off-balance-sheet activities, and the activities
of insiders. Based on this process, examiners determine the
bank’s CAMELS rating, which is the single metric used by
34
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regulators to capture bank safety and soundness. (“CAMELS”
is an acronym for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management,
Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk.).
Regulators have tremendous power to influence bank decision-making. Much of the actual power resides with bank examiners in their conduct of bank examinations. For example, the
decision to change a bank’s CAMELS rating from 2 to 3 (moving
the bank from “fundamentally sound” to indicating “some
degree of supervisory concern”) is largely if not entirely within
the discretion of the bank examiner. Because any regulatory intervention depends on examiners to identify problems and pursue
initial ratings downgrades, effective incentives for examiners
to act are crucial for optimal regulation. Examiner passivity, by
contrast, effectively insulates a troubled bank from higher-level
scrutiny and corrective sanctions.
Reports by inspectors general of the Treasury Department
conclude that regulators did not do enough to prevent multiple
banks from taking excessive risk and failing. Although acute
funding constraints were a precipitating factor for many bank
failures, this shock was not sufficient to explain bank failures.
One report explains, “Although the deterioration in the bank’s
financial condition was severe in 2008, the underlying risks were
evident in the preceding years.” The consensus seems to be that
if regulators had been more aggressive, hundreds of billions in
losses could have been avoided.
In general, regulatory failures fell into two broad but discrete
categories that correspond to the supervisory functions. The
first category is the failure to adequately inspect and supervise
bank risk taking during “good” times—that is, periods without
financial stress. We might think of this as a failure to do adequate
preventive medicine. The failure reports describe many instances
in which the regulators did not ensure compliance with basic
risk policies and/or restrict certain types of risk taking. For
instance, regarding the failure of IndyMac in 2008, the inspector
general of the Treasury Department concluded that “examiners
did not identify or sufficiently address the core weaknesses that
ultimately caused the thrift to fail until it was too late.” As noted
above, problems often resulted from the failure to deploy regulatory tools as banks took increasingly large and risky positions.
The second category is the failure to react to signs of distress
and intervene quickly enough to prevent further damage. The
$2.5 billion collapse of NetBank illustrates. According to the
Treasury Department inspector general, the Office of Thrift
Supervision “did not react in a timely and forceful manner to
certain repeated indications of problems.” A similar lapse preceded the $2 billion failure of ANB Financial. The regulator—the
Office of the Comptroller of Currency—“did not issue a formal
enforcement action in a timely manner” after the bank began to
suffer losses and experience distress.
The failure reports show that, in both categories of supervision, regulators engaged in more box-checking and paperwork
than aggressive oversight. Bank examiners did the important
work of assessing bank assets and risk. They saw deficiencies and
recommended changes, but then never followed up to see if those

changes were implemented. For instance, WaMu’s regulator did
not “formally track the status of examiner recommendations and
[required] corrective actions.” Another (typical) report concluded:
We found that bank management did not effectively implement key
examiner recommendations over several examination cycles regarding
such controls as loan-to-value limits, interest reserve policies,
stress testing and establishing meaningful concentration limits,
and maintenance of a sufficient [allowance for losses] and
adequate capital structure. (Emphasis added.)

This same phenomenon recurred with shocking frequency in the
recent bank failures.
Regulators’ incentives | Why would examiners, who repeatedly identified problem areas, continue to rate WaMu and
other banks so highly in the face of obvious shortcomings in
their business models and practices? Why did examiners err so
egregiously on the side of nonintervention, in the face of specific policy guidance to the contrary? The answer is incentives.
Like everyone else, bank examiners maximize according to the
incentive structure in which they find themselves. Bank examiners are paid almost entirely in fixed salary that varies primarily by
seniority. Examiners also cannot easily be terminated. They enjoy
the special job security fashioned by the civil service rules. This
job security may make some sense. With their fixed salaries, if
examiners could be terminated for poor performance, they might
be extremely risk averse. For example, if a bank failure on an
examiner’s watch significantly increased her risk of termination,
the regulator’s incentive would be to ensure that the bank was
not taking much risk. Though good for the regulator, the social
cost from reduced credit availability and lost bank profits might
be quite high. Reduced job security might also subject examiners
to political pressure for doing their jobs too well. Regulated banks
might be able to bring political pressure to bear on conscientious
regulators unwilling, say, to allow a failing bank to continue
operating or to permit a bank’s excessive risk taking. Job security
therefore reduces counterproductive risk aversion and the risk of
political capture, giving examiners discretion in applying regulation, perhaps in ways that improve social welfare.
But without additional incentives, the civil service rules
may also create perverse incentives by insulating regulators too
well from the consequences of their job performance. With pay
delinked from an objective performance metric, regulators may
naturally focus on bureaucratic tasks with observable outcomes,
rather than on more aggressive and costly actions with more
complex and less transparent cause-and-effect relationships.
Performing the examination and filling out examination
reports is entirely within the examiners’ control. This output is
subject to objective performance metrics (e.g., is the report completed on time and in a competent manner?). And reports alone
are unlikely to generate collateral costs for examiners. In contrast,
aggressive follow-up enforcement is likely to raise the personal
costs to examiners significantly, with little or no personal benefit.
As the work moves from investigation to persuasion—both of

higher-ups and the regulated party, each of which may push back
strongly—costs for regulators will rise. Regulators interested in
not appearing before congressional committees, defending budgets, and being forced to testify in court would likely err on the
side of regulatory restraint, especially when they do not capture
the upside from aggressive regulation and do not bear much of
the downside cost of laxity.
There is also the revolving door problem. Some regulators are
bound to get some of their expected compensation from future
employment with regulated banks. These banks may prefer as
future employees those examiners who show diligence in their
work but passivity in the face of bank interests or pressure.
Examiners may also fear making a mistake by restricting the
lending of a seemingly successful bank. This problem may be
exacerbated by the fact that examiners routinely work with the
same bank for extended periods. They often go to work every day
at the bank they are examining. While it is possible that familiarity breeds contempt, the opposite effect—akin to the Stockholm
syndrome—may also skew regulatory decisions, especially where
actions require confrontation.
Moreover, the relative secrecy surrounding bank examinations
may also encourage regulatory inertia. Secrecy no doubt plays a
useful role in encouraging bankers to be forthcoming with their
examiners. Secrecy also insulates banks from the possibility of public overreaction to negative assessments from bank examinations,
thereby avoiding the runs that deposit insurance and banking
regulation were meant to cure. At the same time, however, secrecy
also insulates examiners and the examination process from public
accountability. When the Securities and Exchange Commission
or the Environmental Protection Agency issues an order or takes
other regulatory action against a violator, that action attracts public scrutiny. Failure to act in the face of egregious circumstances
similarly attracts public attention. While public perception may
not always be a useful metric for evaluating regulatory action, at
the least it forces regulators to explain their actions—or inactions.
Bank supervision, by contrast, is largely free from this accountability because of the secrecy of bank examinations.
Examiner passivity could be deterred by the loss of reputation, money, or other benefit because of the examiner’s failure
to act against a bank that later collapses. But no such deterrent
currently exists. If a bank fails, there are multiple causes to which
blame can be assigned. In contrast, there is only the examiner
to blame if reports are not accurately completed and done well.
Under existing incentives, examiners might naturally conclude
that their job is well done simply by accurately describing problems and bringing them to the attention of management and
senior regulators. They have no stake in doing more. Job and salary security reduce incentives to do “good” work, however defined,
since the consequences of “bad” work are reduced.
To be sure, many regulators value doing the right thing and
serving the public interest. But given the ambiguity of these
terms and the potential for rationalization, the absence of monetary or reputational rewards or sanctions means examiners care
less than they would in the presence of more high-powered incenSpring 2012
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tives. We do not doubt the honesty or good faith of the regulators
who felt that they were doing the best they could do. We simply
observe that regulators are influenced in ways beyond their ken,
just as we all are. They respond rationally to the incentives they
face, and can rationalize their conduct to fit to those incentives.
We propose to change the incentives.

The Structure of Regulator Pay for Performance
The regulatory laxity preceding the recent crisis involved two
distinct types of regulatory failure: the failure to apply preventive medicine when times were good and the failure to act
aggressively when a bank showed signs of distress. Our incentive pay proposal has two distinct components to address those
separate problems.
Bank debt-equity portfolio | First, offering a bonus linked
to a bank debt-equity portfolio would offer real-time market
feedback and long-run incentives to the examiner regarding the
bank’s risk taking and its potential rewards. This component
would matter primarily during good times, while the bank
is operating in the ordinary course. Its purpose is to incentivize preventive and remedial measures well before a bank
approaches distress.
We consider two potential debt benchmarks:
■■ a subordinated debt security issued by the bank, and
■■ a credit default swap contract (CDS) referencing a junior

debt obligation of the bank holding company parent of the
regulated bank (BHC).
The prices of publicly traded subordinated debt securities and
CDS contracts reflect the market’s best estimate of the risk of the
bank’s default on its debt. Holding this risk-sensitive instrument
gives the examiner a personal financial incentive to curb excessive risk at the bank. (Some amount of BHC equity should be
included as well in order to guard against undue examiner risk
aversion.) With both the debt and equity components, we suggest
a relative performance approach, which would filter out the effect
of industry-wide or market-wide price movements. As noted, the
lion’s share of this “preventive medicine” component of incentive
pay should be debt-based.
To encourage a medium- to long-term regulatory perspective,
each periodic phantom debt-equity allocation would have a specified medium- to long-term maturity. At maturity, say three to five
years after the initial award, the allocation would be cashed out
at the then–market values of its underlying debt and equity components. With regular periodic allocations, the examiner would
hold multiple tranches of phantom securities with staggered
payouts, giving the examiner incentive to consider the long-term
as well as short-term consequences of her regulatory decisions,
and making short-term manipulations of securities prices an
unattractive strategy.
The appropriate debt-equity mix in the regulator’s portfolio
will depend on a number of factors, some of which will be specific
36
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to the regulated bank, to the regulating agency, to the particular
times, and perhaps even to the individual examiner. We therefore
make no attempt to offer firm prescriptions for the optimal ratio.
The mix should induce regulators to care about bank profits but
not at the expense of risk shifting to creditors. In the face of excessive risk, the negative reaction from debt markets should reduce
the value of the debt component of the portfolio by more than
any positive reaction from equity markets would augment the
value of the equity component.
Takeover bonus | Our second component, the takeover bonus,

becomes important as a bank approaches distress. The examiner would be eligible for a cash bonus based on the timing
of her decision to take over a failing bank. Regulators have a
number of reasons to wait too long before effecting a takeover.
This bonus would ameliorate the problem.
Bank regulators are by statute tasked with the specific goal
of minimizing losses to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). The
bonus could therefore be tied specifically to the ultimate losses
sustained by the DIF at the resolution of the FDIC’s receivership
proceeding. We suggest several approaches to estimating these
losses ex ante in order to incentivize improved timing of bank
takeover decisions.
The takeover decision requires special treatment for a number
of reasons. First, it is the most difficult and drastic decision the regulator must make in her supervision of the bank. The regulator has
a number of reasons for being reluctant to pull the plug on a failing
bank. Regulatory capture and the Stockholm effect may dissuade
the regulator from taking over the bank. Pulling the plug might
also highlight the regulator’s past mistakes in not intervening
more forcefully. At any given point, the regulator might prefer to
wait and see, hoping the bank will turn itself around. As the recent
financial crisis illustrates—like all others before it—regulators tend
to err on the side of taking over too late rather than too early. This
delay in the crisis exacerbated banks’ losses and the ultimate costs
to the DIF. A resolution bonus would offer a direct incentive to
make the right timing decision at a critical juncture.
Moreover, although the FDIC is charged by statute with the
specific goal of minimizing DIF losses in its dealings with troubled banks, the FDIC is typically not involved in the takeover decision, which rests with each bank’s chartering agency or primary
federal regulator. The FDIC takes over only after a bank has been
declared insolvent and put into resolution. Because the other
agencies do not have their own money at stake in the timing of
the takeover, the incentives to wait and see may be overwhelming.
Market discipline from the regulator’s bank debt-equity
portfolio may not be useful in optimizing the timing of takeover
because of information asymmetry. Market signals are likely to
be noisy as a bank nears distress. Optimal timing will depend to
a great extent on fine-grained private information, which is available only to the regulator and is constantly being updated once
takeover becomes a real possibility. A one-time bonus distinct
from any market assessment of the decision is therefore advisable.
Because of the importance of minimizing DIF losses, low

losses should trigger high bonuses and vice-versa. In theory, then,
if an examiner were to put a bank into resolution at time T1, and
as a result the FDIC losses were 100, the examiner would get a
larger bonus than if the decision were made at T2 when the FDIC
losses would be 200.
Implementing this simple idea may not be straightforward.
First, if we could discern the counterfactual losses that would
have occurred at T2, then the calculation would be simple. But, of
course, a takeover at T1 makes it impossible to know the counterfactual T2 outcome. Second, it is entirely possible that a conscientious examiner might decide, given the information available
to her at T1, to wait until T2 for more information. Important
developments concerning the bank’s prospects—the direction of
certain asset or lending markets, for example—might be worth
waiting for. Perhaps paradoxically, the more uncertain are the
bank’s prospects, the more value there is in waiting. Third, even if
a regulator made an (ex ante) optimally timed decision to resolve a
failed bank, disposing of the bank’s assets may take several years.
That process will affect the ultimate DIF loss figures and will not
be under the examiner’s control. So a “final” resolution will be
hard to predict at the time of takeover.
Despite these seeming hurdles, a resolution bonus may still
offer important motivation for a regulator to act promptly in putting a bank into resolution, as compared to the current compensation system. The timing of the takeover will no doubt have an
important effect on the severity of DIF losses, and warning signs
in terms of bank characteristics and practices that lead to large
resolution losses are not so mysterious. Researchers have identified factors that correlate with increased losses and estimated
the economic magnitudes of these effects. The findings generally comport with common intuition. Bank asset composition
and quality affect ultimate losses, as does liability structure. For
example, brokered deposits—“hot money” aggregated by brokers
seeking higher yields—are positively associated with high-cost
bank failures and shorter time to failure. The same is true for real
estate owned and loans past due. Uncollected income—basically,
nonperforming loans—correlates with high-cost failures. Local
economic conditions also matter. State personal income growth
and the health of the local banking industry are negatively correlated with FDIC losses, while in-state bankruptcy growth and
the unemployment rate are positively correlated with FDIC losses.
The depth of existing research strongly suggests that a resolution bonus algorithm could be constructed to both guide and
cabin regulators’ discretion as to the timing of a bank takeover.
Some trial and error would be involved in optimizing the bonus
structure in pursuit of minimizing DIF losses, but with learning
and experience it might be possible to design a fully automated
system in which market and other data are incorporated into the
bonus algorithm.
Short of that, agencies can develop a mechanism for estimating what losses would have been had the examiner not acted when
she did. For example, post-mortem reports, like those described
above, could be helpful. The inspector general of the FDIC could
estimate losses at hypothetical future intervals had the examiner

not taken over the bank when she did. These reports could deploy
a mix of economic models, learning from past failures, and expert
opinions from inside and outside the regulatory agency.
Could the takeover bonus induce the regulator to act too
hastily in seizing a bank? Premature takeover is no more desirable than waiting too long; both destroy value. The regulator’s
debt-equity portfolio would ameliorate the problem to a great
extent because it gives the regulator a financial stake in the bank’s
recovery. The key is to scale the takeover bonus relative to the
potential value of the regulator’s debt-equity portfolio so that she
neither permits futile gambles for solvency nor pulls the plug too
early. Agencies might even implement non-trivial penalties for a
takeover decision if the DIF ultimately suffers no losses because
the examiner pulled the plug too soon.
Even if predicting ultimate FDIC losses is not an exact science for the regulator making the takeover decision, neither is
the loss assessment inscrutable. A lack of research or analysis is
unlikely to be the reason why regulators have been too slow to
pull the plug on failed banks. Empirical studies—many done by
the FDIC—and post-mortem reports offer regulators a wealth of
research to support the goal of minimizing DIF losses. Instead,
regulators may simply need better incentives to get it right. A wellstructured bonus may help ameliorate this problem.

Qualifications and Objections
Incentive structures may sometimes generate not only desired
outcomes but also some that are unintended and undesired.
Our regulator incentive pay proposal is no exception. We do
believe, however, that potential problems either can be overcome or are not sufficiently serious to preclude the experimentation along the lines we suggest.
Crowding out the public interest | Some might object that
incentive pay is fundamentally inconsistent with public service.
Financial rewards for “success” might change the public-regarding culture within regulatory agencies; financial incentives
may crowd out the public spiritedness that would otherwise
motivate employees. Instead of diligent altruistic service to the
public, regulators and other agency employees might begin to
view their roles in terms of market exchange. Regulators desiring higher compensation would pursue the proffered financial
rewards, while those who value leisure might feel free to work
less and forgo the rewards for diligence. Once diligence has
been priced, perhaps some regulators will slack.
In addition, the type of person that chooses to be a bank
examiner could change. Regulators have employment choices,
and their choice to be regulators likely derives at least in part from
their interest in public service. This public spirit is an important
regulatory asset and should be husbanded. Public service motives
might be displaced by financial motivations among new hires
after implementation of an incentive compensation scheme.
Eventually, the composition of the regulatory agency could
change for the worse.
Spring 2012
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We do not discount these concerns. Social scientists have documented the crowding-out effect in experimental settings. We do not
believe, however, the effect is necessarily universal or sufficiently well
understood that experimentation with incentive compensation
for regulators should be precluded. Moreover, as described above,
the federal government has already begun experimenting with
financial incentives for regulators. Enormous pay raises have been
implemented at several executive agencies. Bank regulators have
received bonuses for “good” performance during the crisis, although
without any transparency or standards of which we are aware. These
examples suggest that public spiritedness and financial reward are
not mutually exclusive, at least up to a point. Our innovation is to
rely on market pricing and specific observable outcomes to set bonus
pay, instead of relying on fiat. Our approach makes incentive pay
more transparent, more sensitive to performance, and less subject
to political, class, gender, racial, or other biases.
As for selection effects, our incremental approach suggests
that such effects from variability of pay are likely to be minor,
at least in the early stages. More generally, the possibility that
increased pay variability might change the mix of individuals
opting to serve as examiners could be a good thing. Examiners
screened by their commitment to the public interest were in
fact insufficiently attentive to that interest during the recent
crisis. Accordingly, attracting individuals interested in a variable
pay-for-social-performance compensation structure may be a
beneficial change.
Noisy proxies | A basic objection to our approach is that it
simply won’t work. Our market-based incentives may be too
blunt to be effective. Even after adjustments for relative performance, many important influences besides the regulator’s
input will affect the market pricing of the bank’s debt and
equity securities. Decisions by the CEO and senior officers, for
example, will generally dwarf the regulator’s influence over the
bank’s performance and the market price of its securities. If the
regulator’s decisions have little impact on the bank or the price
of its securities, the argument goes, then our scheme will have
weak if any incentive effects on regulators.
Moreover, though private firms often extend option compensation to rank-and-file employees, and not just executives, there is
some debate as to whether broad-based option plans create effective performance incentives. No matter how much harder they
work, individual employees are not likely to be able to exert much
influence on firm value. Given their individual small shares in
their firms, they might rather free ride than increase their effort.
These potential obstacles to performance pay schemes in
private firms should not deter us, however. Our situation is different. Regulators are not tasked with the general goal of increasing
banks’ value. Their charge is far more specific and their incentive
structure is more targeted. Regulators’ charge is to guard against
excessive bank risk taking, and our debt-heavy portfolio of phantom bank securities focuses regulators on that task. In a well-run
bank that does not incur excessive risk, it may be true—as with
rank-and-file employees in private firms—that examiners’ ability
38
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to affect the value of the bank’s securities and their own debtheavy portfolios is weak or non-existent. But that is as it should
be. The regulator has only a minor role to play at a bank that is
not pushing the risk envelope. Moreover, in that situation, the
costs to the government of performance incentives are low since
the market value of the bank’s debt will probably not move much.
The bank’s debt will enjoy a consistently low risk premium.
However, in the opposite scenario, when a bank pushes the
risk envelope and the market value of its debt declines, examiners have personal financial incentives to respond. This is the
situation where performance incentives cause the regulator’s
self-interest to correspond with social welfare interests, inducing
the regulator’s vigilance. If that situation never comes to pass, all
the better. It may be that, especially during good times, regulatory
action has little effect on most banks’ value or the value of most
banks’ securities. However, when a bank strays, prompt and effective regulatory action may be critical to avoiding large losses. For
this bank and this regulator, the incentives will matter.

Conclusion
There is no reason we can think of why bank regulators should
not be paid for performance. The crucial issues are whether one
can identify what “good” and “bad” performance are, whether
contracts can be written ex ante that operationalize these metrics, and whether the potential negative effects from introducing a pay-for-performance culture for regulators outweigh the
potential social welfare gains. We have argued that bank regulation is an area where there are readily available metrics, where
plausible contracts or payment schedules could be devised, and
where the potential for crowd-out or other downsides from
incentive pay are limited.
Accordingly, we propose that bank examiners be paid in part
with a mix of debt-heavy incentives linked to bank equity and
debt values. This pay should represent a substantial but not dominant part of examiner pay, should be paid out over a number of
years, and should adjust in order to maintain incentives aligned
with the regulatory mission of ensuring that bank risk taking is
aligned with the social welfare. A separate takeover bonus would
encourage examiners to make bank takeover decisions optimally
to minimize DIF losses.
Although seemingly radical, our proposal is consistent with
recent moves by regulators to pay bonuses for good work and to
generally increase the quality and efficiency of regulation. It is
also consistent with laws and academic proposals to alter bank
CEO pay to take greater account of the social component of bank
losses. Our contribution is to merely point out that regulator
incentives are an overlooked but crucial factor affecting bank
risk taking, and that improving the social performance of banks
and the banking system requires a consideration of the incentives
not only of bank CEOs but also of bank regulators. Insofar as we
can improve the efficiency of government regulators, we need to
worry less about the structure of private incentives, which are
further from the control of government.
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